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Post-Sale Duties
THE MOST EXPANSIVE THEORY IN
PRODUCTS LIABILITY
Kenneth Ross & Professor J. David Prince†
I.

INTRODUCTION

Manufacturing, designing, and selling safe products does not
totally satisfy a product manufacturer’s legal duties. A few U.S. courts,
starting in 1959, held that manufacturers have a duty to warn product
users when they learn of risks in their product after sale even if the
product was not defective when sold.1 A number of courts, on the other
hand, held that there was no such duty.2
In the 1990s, the American Law Institute (“ALI”) considered the
status of products liability law in the United States. This culminated in
the publication of the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability
(“Restatement (Third)”).3 The Institute had to decide whether enough
precedent existed to support a section on the “post-sale duty to warn” in
this enunciation of products liability law.
The law professors who served as the drafters of the Restatement
(Third) (“Reporters”), considered all of the cases through 1997, and
despite a split of authority, felt there was sufficient support in case law
and common sense to support a “post-sale duty to warn in the

†
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professor at both William Mitchell College of Law in St. Paul, Minnesota and the University of
Minnesota Law School. J. David Prince is a Professor of Law at William Mitchell College of Law
and is Of Counsel to Larson King, LLP in St. Paul, Minnesota. Versions of Parts I through IX of this
Article appeared in Kenneth Ross, Post-Sale Duty to Warn: A Critical Cause of Action, 26 N. KY. L.
REV. 573, 573-87 (1999) and Kenneth Ross, Post-Sale Duty to Warn: A Critical Cause of Action, 27
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 339, 339-52 (2000) and appear with permission of both Northern Kentucky
Law Review and William Mitchell Law Review.
1
Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871 (N.Y. 1984) (“Although a product [may] be
reasonably safe when manufactured and sold and involve no then known risks of which warning
need be given, risks thereafter revealed by user operation and brought to the attention of the
manufacturer or vendor may impose upon one or both a duty to warn.” (citations omitted)); see also
Comstock v. Gen. Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Mich. 1959); Walton v. Avco Corp., 610
A.2d 454, 459 (Pa. 1992).
2
Williams v. Monarch Mach. Tool Co., 26 F.3d 228 (1st Cir. 1994) (no post sale duty
to warn if product was reasonably safe at the time of sale); see also Romero v. Int’l Harvester Co.,
979 F.2d 1444, 1449 (10th Cir. 1992); Carrizales v. Rheem Mfg. Co., 589 N.E.2d 569, 579 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1991).
3
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. (1998).
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Restatement (Third).4 This proposed inclusion resulted in widespread
debate. The plaintiff-oriented members of the Institute wanted this
section included while some of the defense-oriented members wanted it
omitted or severely limited.5 Post-sale duty to warn was ultimately
included in the final Restatement (Third).6
The Restatement (Third) and supporting case law require
manufacturers or product suppliers, in certain instances to provide postsale warnings or possibly to recall or repair products.7 In analyzing
possible post-sale liability, it is important that manufacturers and product
suppliers be aware of the factors that may trigger a post-sale duty under
the common law. In addition, manufacturers and product suppliers need
to be very familiar with post-sale duties imposed on them by U.S.
agencies and, if the product is sold outside the U.S., by foreign
government agencies. Armed with this knowledge, they can establish
procedures to identify the existence of the duty and implement
appropriate post-sale remedial measures to prevent or limit exposure
based on post-sale conduct.
This Article provides an overview of the Restatement (Third)’s
post-sale duty sections. In addition, it discusses relevant case law and the
impact of the Restatement (Third) on developing case law. Part II
provides a background of the post-sale duty sections of the Restatement
(Third). Parts III-IX look back to case law prior to the Restatement
(Third) and analyze how courts at that time dealt with post-sale duty
issues including negligence standards, post-sale knowledge, defect
timing questions, identification of product users, the duty to inform of
safety improvements, and the duty to recall. Part X examines case law
decisions that post-date the Restatement (Third)’s drafting, divided
according to whether the court accepted, rejected, or adopted some
variation of the Restatement sections. And lastly, Part XI provides a brief
discussion of regulatory post-sale duties.
II.

RESTATEMENT (THIRD): SECTIONS 10, 11, AND 13

The Restatement (Second) of Torts: Products Liability
“Restatement (Second)”) added section 402A in 1965 to adopt newlydeveloped common law rules making product manufacturers strictly
liable for harms caused by defective products. But section 402A did not
contain post-sale duty provisions.8 According to section 388 of the
Restatement (Second), warnings were required only if a risk associated
4

See James A. Henderson, Jr. & Aaron D. Twerski, The Politics of the Products
Liability Restatement, 26 HOFSTRA L. REV. 667 (1998), for a general discussion of the process by
which the Reporters and the American Law Institute decided which sections to include.
5
Id.
6
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (1998).
7
Id. §§ 10-11, 13.
8
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 2D § 402A (1965).
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with a product was known or should have been known at the time of
sale.9 The post-sale duty section in the Restatement (Third) was truly new
when written, not merely a revision of section 388. It provides as
follows:
§ 10. Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused
by Post-Sale Failure to Warn
(a) One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the seller’s failure
to provide a warning after the time of sale or distribution of a product if a
reasonable person in the seller’s position would provide such a warning.
(b) A reasonable person in the seller’s position would provide a warning after
the time of sale if:
(1) the seller knows or reasonably should know that the product poses
a substantial risk of harm to persons or property; and
(2) those to whom a warning might be provided can be identified and
can reasonably be assumed to be unaware of the risk of harm; and
(3) a warning can be effectively communicated to and acted on by
those to whom a warning might be provided; and
(4) the risk of harm is sufficiently great to justify the burden of
providing a warning.10

The Reporters considered post-sale warnings to be the “most
expansive area in the law of products liability” and a “monster duty.”11
However, the Reporters felt that section 10 limited this monster duty by
requiring the plaintiff to prove all four factors before they would be
allowed to pursue this claim.12
Section 10 does not include a duty to do anything other than
warn.13 However, since there was case law holding that, in certain narrow
instances, a manufacturer may have a duty to recall or retrofit a product,
the ALI decided to also deal with this precedent.14 Given the great burden
of any post-sale activities, especially recall, the Institute included a
section severely limiting the duty to recall a product.15 Section 11 of the
Restatement (Third) provides as follows:
§ 11. Liability of Commercial Product Seller or Distributor for Harm Caused
by Post-Sale Failure to Recall Product
9

Id. § 388.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (1998).
11
JAMES A. HENDERSON, JR. & AARON TWERSKI, TEACHER’S MANUAL FOR PRODUCTS
LIABILITY: PROBLEMS AND PROCESS 159 (6th ed. 2008).
12
Id.
13
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 (1998), cmt. a.
14
Braniff Airways, Inc. v. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 411 F.2d 451, 453 (2d Cir. 1969);
Downing v. Overhead Door Corp., 707 P.2d 1027, 1033 (Colo. Ct. App. 1985).
10

15

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 (1998).
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One engaged in the business of selling or otherwise distributing products is
subject to liability for harm to persons or property caused by the seller’s failure
to recall a product after the time of sale or distribution if:
(a) (1) a governmental directive issued pursuant to a statute or administrative
regulation specifically requires the seller or distributor to recall the product; or
(2) the seller or distributor, in the absence of a recall requirement under
Subsection (a)(1), undertakes to recall the product; and
(b) the seller or distributor fails to act as a reasonable person in recalling the
product.16

Section 11 basically provides that the seller or distributor is not
liable for a failure to recall the product unless the recall is required by
statute or regulation or the seller or distributor voluntarily undertakes to
recall the product and does so negligently.17 The main reason for
including section 11 was to make it clear that section 10 does not include
a duty to recall the product. However, section 11 also included the socalled “Good Samaritan” doctrine where liability can attach for a
negligent recall, even if it is voluntary.18
The last section pertaining to the post-sale duty to warn is
section 13.19 This section, which concerns a successor’s liability for a
failure to issue a post-sale warning, states in part:
§ 13. Liability of Successor for Harm Caused by Successor’s Own Post-Sale
Failure to Warn
(a) A successor corporation or other business entity that acquires assets of a
predecessor corporation or other business entity, whether or not liable under the
rule stated in § 12,20 is subject to liability for harm to persons or property
caused by the successor’s failure to warn of a risk created by a product sold or
distributed by the predecessor if:
(1) the successor undertakes or agrees to provide services for maintenance
or repair of the product or enters into a similar relationship with purchasers of
the predecessor’s products giving rise to actual or potential economic
advantage to the successor, and
(2) a reasonable person in the position of the successor would provide a
warning.21

The section further states that a reasonable person in the
successor’s position would provide such a warning if the four conditions
in section 10 are met.22
16

Id.
Id.
18
Id. §§ 11(a)(2)-11(b) & cmt. c (1998).
19
Id. § 13.
20
Id. § 12. Section 12 provides for liability for a successor manufacturer even if a
predecessor manufacturer sold the product in a defective condition. Id.
21
Id. § 13.
22
Id.
17
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Case law supported the inclusion of section 13 into the
Restatement (Third)’s post-sale duty sections and emphasizes the same
important factors for finding successor liability.23
III.

DISTINGUISHING POST-SALE DUTY FROM TIME-OF-SALE DUTY

In examining case law prior to publication of the Restatement
(Third), it became apparent to the Reporters that there was great
confusion by juries, judges, and scholars.24 Many of the cases reviewed
were unclear as to whether the jury or judge believed that the product
was defective when sold or whether the product only became defective
after sale.
If it was defective when sold, then it was judged under section
402A (or now section 2 of the Restatement (Third)).25 Since the
Restatement (Second) did not have a post-sale duty section, courts that
discussed this new theory of liability simply assumed that the defect
became known after sale without considering whether it was defective
when sold.26
The Restatement (Third) makes it clear that this post-sale duty is
independent of a time-of-sale defect and therefore selling a defective
product can result in claims of time-of-sale defect and also post-sale
failure to warn.27 In addition, the Restatement (Third) makes it clear that
if the product was defective when sold, the manufacturer cannot be
absolved of liability by issuing a post-sale warning for harms caused
before any warning is issued.28
While the Restatement (Third) is generally viewed as favorable
to product manufacturers and sellers, section 10 clearly establishes a
cause of action that creates opportunities for plaintiffs to argue for
further discovery of post-sale actions and greater admissibility of postsale accidents, thereby providing a greater chance of an award of
punitive damages.29
23

Sherlock v. Quality Control Equip. Co., 79 F.3d 731, 734 (8th Cir. 1996) (“The critical
element required for the imposition of the duty is a continuing relationship between the successor
and the predecessor’s customers for the benefit of the successor.”); Patton v. TIC United Corp., 77
F.3d 1235, 1240 (10th Cir. 1996) (“[A] ‘successor entity’ . . . may incur a duty to warn if it has
knowledge of the defective condition of the predecessor’s product, and has a ‘more than casual’
relationship with the customers of the predecessor entity that is an ‘economic benefit’ to the
successor.” (quoting Stratton v. Garvey Int’l, Inc., 676 P.2d 1290, 1294 (Kan. Ct. App. 1984))).
24
Henderson & Twerski, supra note 4, at 669.
25
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS 2D § 402A (1965); RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF
TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2 (1998).
26
Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 835 (Minn. 1988).
27
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. j (1998).
28
Id.
29
Researchers analyzing punitive damage cases have found almost 75% of such awards
to be based on the failure of a manufacturer to take appropriate post-sale actions. Michael Rustad, In
Defense of Punitive Damages in Products Liability: Testing Tort Anecdotes with Empirical Data, 78
IOWA L. REV. 1, 66 (1992).
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In addition, by stating that a manufacturer cannot cut off liability
no matter how effective the post-sale warning program, this section
almost creates absolute liability for injuries sustained by a product defect
that was known after sale and where the manufacturer undertakes a less
than reasonable post-sale warning program.30 Plaintiffs can now argue
that a program that was not successful in warning them was not
reasonable. And, arguably, when it comes to post-sale programs, the
manufacturer or product supplier can always do more.
IV.

A CAUSE OF ACTION BASED ON POST-SALE DUTY SOUNDS IN
NEGLIGENCE

While synthesizing years of judicial consideration of post-sale
issues, section 10 still raises many questions that have been and will be
litigated for years.31 One aspect of section 10, however, is clear: A cause
of action based on post-sale duties must sound in negligence, since the
reasonableness of a product supplier’s conduct is the focus of the postsale inquiry.32
According to section 10(b), a seller can only be subject to postsale duties if a “reasonable” person would have supplied such a
warning.33 The four factors of section 10(b) are fact-based, making the
reasonableness of supplying a post-sale warning the key to establishing a
post-sale duty.34
Judging post-sale conduct through the lens of negligence is
consistent with case law prior to the adoption of the Restatement
(Third).35 Actual or constructive knowledge of a post-sale risk is
necessary to impose a post-sale duty.36 Also, negligence is the correct
legal theory when a manufacturer’s conduct is at issue,37 and as such,
application of a post-sale duty depends on the reasonableness of the
manufacturer’s conduct.38 Consequently, a product supplier cannot be
strictly liable for post-sale conduct under section 10.
V.

ACQUISITION OF POST-SALE KNOWLEDGE

Section 10, by confirming the existence of post-sale duties in the
law, created an affirmative duty for product suppliers to exercise
30

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. j (1998).
See infra Parts III and X.
32
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. b (1998).
33
Id. § 10(a).
34
Id. § 10(b).
35
See id.§ 10 cmt. b (1998).
36
Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1314 (Kan. 1993);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10(b)(1) (1998).
37
Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d at 1310.
38
Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 409 (N.D. 1994).
31
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reasonable care to learn of post-sale problems with their products.
Section 10(a) bases a post-sale duty, in part, on suppliers who know or
reasonably should know that their products pose a substantial risk of
harm to persons or property.39 In addition, comment c states that the
general duty of reasonable care may require manufacturers to investigate
when reasonable grounds exist for the seller to suspect that a hitherto
unknown risk exists.40
However, comment c to section 10 also makes it clear that,
except for prescription drugs and medical devices,41 “constantly
monitoring product performance in the field is usually too burdensome”
and will not support a post-sale duty.42 Despite this language, plaintiffs
have tried to use section 10 and comment c to impose a broader duty on
product suppliers to establish systems to obtain information from the
field. The failure of a manufacturer to set up a system to gather post-sale
information and then claim a lack of knowledge, may appear
unreasonable to a jury, especially when one could be set up with little
effort and expense.
Many courts, however, reflected concerns similar to those raised
in the Restatement (Third) about imposing too heavy of a burden on
manufacturers to monitor field performance. In Patton v. Hutchinson
Wil-Rich Manufacturing Company, the Kansas Supreme Court held that
plaintiffs who allege post-sale duty claims must prove that manufacturers
“acquired knowledge of a [post-sale] defect.”43 The case did not,
however, impose an affirmative duty on suppliers to take reasonable
steps to learn of post-sale problems that were not brought to their
attention. This is consistent with earlier opinions.44
The language in section 10 could be used to argue that the scope
of other manufacturers’ and suppliers’ legal duties are extended by
requiring reasonable affirmative actions to learn of post-sale product
risks. Regardless of the legal duty, affirmatively trying to learn of postsale risks is a beneficial activity for enhancing product safety and
preventing accidents.
39

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10(a) (1998).
Id. § 10 cmt. c.
39
Long-standing case law requires prescription drug and medical device manufacturers
to keep themselves informed of scientific developments and provide the medical profession with
information about the risks of drugs already on the market. This affirmative duty for drug and device
manufacturers is consistent with the language in section 10 and may also be imposed by the Code of
Federal Regulations for other products. See, e.g., Tinnerholm v. Parke Davis & Co., 285 F. Supp.
432, 451 (S.D.N.Y. 1968); Baker v. St. Agnes Hosp., 421 N.Y.S.2d 81, 85 (N.Y. App. Div. 1979).
42
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. c (1998).
43
Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg., 861 P.2d at 1314.
44
McAlpin v. Leeds & Northrup Co., 912 F. Supp. 207, 210 (W.D. Va. 1996) (“ends of
justice” require a manufacturer to warn if the manufacturer is made aware of the defect (quoting
Island Creek Coal Co. v. Lake Shore, Inc., 832 F.2d 274, 280 (4th Cir. 1987))); Comstock v. Gen.
Motors Corp., 99 N.W.2d 627, 634 (Mich. 1959) (duty triggered when knowledge of post-sale risk
“becomes known” to manufacturers); Cover v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 871 (N.Y. 1984) (post-sale
duty triggered by knowledge “brought to the attention of” manufacturers and vendors).
40
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EXISTENCE OF THE DEFECT: A QUESTION OF TIMING

Section 10(a) obviously contemplated that knowledge of a risk
or defect acquired by a supplier must be obtained after the sale.45 The
section is less clear about when the defect must actually come into
existence. Comment a to section 10 explains that a post-sale duty may be
imposed “whether or not the product is defective at the time of original
sale.”46 The Institute acknowledged in comment a that imposing a postsale duty, even if the product was not defective when sold, was relatively
new.47 It was quick to point out, however, that the requirement that the
plaintiff prove section 10’s four factors should prevent “unbounded” and
onerous post-sale burdens on product sellers.48
The position of section 10—that it is immaterial whether the
defect existed at the time of sale—contrasts with many decisions where
courts have refused to impose post-sale duties when products were not
defective when sold.49
VII.

PRODUCT USERS: CAN THEY BE IDENTIFIED?

Section 10(b) requires proof that people to whom a post-sale
warning should be provided can be identified before a post-sale duty is
triggered.50 This case-specific inquiry depends on a number of factors
including the type of product, the number of units sold, the number of
potential users, the availability of records, and the available means of
tracing product users.51 Comment e makes it clear that when no records
identifying the customers are available, a post-sale duty does not arise.52
These factors formed the basis for the Wisconsin Supreme
Court’s holding that the manufacturer of a sausage stuffing machine had
a duty to provide users with information about a new safety by-pass
valve.53 The machines were sold to a limited market where the
manufacturer knew all of the product’s owners.54 The Wisconsin court
made it clear, however, that it was not crafting an absolute post-sale duty
for all manufacturers to warn of safety improvements year after year
since many products are mass-produced and tracing users to warn of
safety improvements would place an undue burden on manufacturers.55
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55

See discussion supra Part V.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a (1998).
Id.
Id.
See infra Part X.F.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10(b)(2) (1998).
Id. § 10 (Reporter’s Note to cmt. a).
Id. § 10 cmt. e.
Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 923 (Wis. 1979).
Id.
Id. at 923-24.
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Similarly, the North Dakota Supreme Court held that it would be
difficult to require the manufacturer of mass-produced tire rims to trace
individual users if the rims were not unique or sold to a specialized group
of customers.56 While recognizing the problem of providing individual
notice to the original purchasers, this court nevertheless held that the
defendant had a duty to warn foreseeable product users about dangers
which were discovered after the product was originally sold.57
An interesting question remains as to how far a manufacturer
must go to identify its customers. What would a reasonable manufacturer
concerned about safety do? Establishing a “traceability” system before
the product is sold is the most effective way to find customers. However,
such systems take planning, considerable effort, and substantial cost.58
The question of whether a particular defendant’s actions are “reasonable”
will be case-specific and decided by the jury. The ALI continually
stresses in comments to section 10 that this duty should not be
“unbounded” and onerous and that courts need to be careful before
imposing such a duty.59
The federal government has jurisdiction over many products and
Congress recently “raised the bar” in this area. In August 2008, the
President signed the Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act,60 which
contains several new provisions to enhance the identification and
tracking of children’s products.61 The federal government already
mandates customer tracking for products such as car seats62 and medical
devices.63
VIII.

DUTY TO INFORM OF SAFETY IMPROVEMENTS

Manufacturers should always strive to improve the safety of their
products. But does the manufacturer have a duty to inform prior
customers of each safety improvement made in similar products
manufactured after the sale of the less safe product? Prior to the drafting
56

Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 408 (N.D. 1994).
Id. at 409; see also Hodder v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 426 N.W.2d 826, 832
(Minn. 1988) (holding tire rim manufacturer had a post-sale duty to instruct and warn, so that
potential users of its product would be apprised of safety hazards which, at an earlier time, were not
fully appreciated).
58
PROD. SAFETY AND LIAB. PREVENTION INTEREST GROUP, AMERICAN SOCIETY FOR
QUALITY, THE PRODUCT RECALL PLANNING GUIDE (2d ed. 1999).
59
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmts. a & d (1998). There are
also several federal guidelines, as well as industry guidelines, describing what might be considered a
reasonable program. For a recent example of an industry produced guideline, see PROD. SAFETY AND
LIAB. PREVENTION INTEREST GROUP, supra note 58.
60
Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) of 2008, H.R. 4040, 110th Cong.
(2008).
61
15 U.S.C. § 2063(a)(5) (2006); Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA)
of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, § 104(d)(2)-(d)(3), 122 Stat. 3016, 3030 (2008) (to be codified at 15
U.S.C. § 2056a).
62
49 C.F.R. § 588.5-6 (2007).
63
21 U.S.C. § 360i(e) (2006).
57
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of Restatement (Third), some courts found it reasonable to impose a duty
to inform purchasers of safety improvements when:
1. There is a continuing relationship between the manufacturer and the
purchaser;
2. The market is limited; and
3. The cost of providing notice of the safety improvement is negligible.64

Most courts prior to 1998, however, found that there was no
post-sale duty to inform customers of safety improvements when the
original product had been properly designed and manufactured.65
Section 10 did not foreclose the imposition of a post-sale duty to
inform about safety improvements but made it clear that the four factors
in that section must be met.66 However, it said that “in most cases it will
be difficult to establish each of the four section 10 factors that are a
necessary predicate for a post-sale duty to warn if the warning is merely
to inform of the availability of a product-safety improvement.”67
It is certain that plaintiffs have tried to use a manufacturer’s
post-sale warning of a product safety improvement to argue that the
original product, without the safety improvement, was defective at the
time of sale. However, any attempt to use the improvement as evidence
of a time-of-sale defect will generally run afoul of evidentiary rules that
preclude the introduction of “remedial measures” evidence.68
A manufacturer must carefully consider whether it is reasonable
and prudent to notify prior customers of safety improvements. The
manufacturer should perform the kind of analysis that is done under
section 10 in deciding whether a duty arises in the first place. If the
manufacturer’s post-sale improvement significantly improves safety and
the manufacturer can easily find its customers, the manufacturer should
consider informing its prior customers about the safety improvement.

64

Bell Helicopter Co. v. Bradshaw, 594 S.W.2d 519 (Tex. Civ. App. 1979) (holding a
duty to retrofit where manufacturer assumed duty to notify users of safety improvements), overruled
in part by Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829 (Tex. 2000); Kozlowski v. John E. Smith’s
Sons Co., 275 N.W.2d 915, 923-24 (Wis. 1979) (holding a duty to inform users of machine of postsale safety improvements where users were traceable).
65
Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1311 (Kan. 1993);
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10 cmt. a (1998).
66
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 10, cmt. a (1998).
67
Id. § 10 (Reporter’s Note to cmt. a).
68
Rule 407 of the Federal Rules of Evidence provides that evidence of measures taken
after an injury “is not admissible to prove negligence, culpable conduct, a defect in a product, a
defect in a product’s design, or a need for a warning or instruction.” FED. R. EVID. 407. Most state
rules of evidence also bar the introduction of such evidence to prove a time-of-sale defect.
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POST-SALE DUTY TO RECALL

Section 11 set forth a limited duty to recall a defective product.69
Comment a made it clear that this duty is different from the post-sale
duty in section 10.70 This comment also says that improvements in
product safety do not trigger a duty to recall or retrofit a product because
that would discourage manufacturers from making safer products.71
This limited duty is based mostly on a government directive
specifically requiring the manufacturer to recall an imminently hazardous
product.72 The Michigan Supreme Court declined an invitation to impose
a common law duty to recall or repair in a negligent design claim where
a plaintiff alleged that a manufacturer knew or should have known of a
defect at the time of sale.73 While Michigan required a warning in such
circumstances, the court concluded that “the duty to repair or recall is
more properly a consideration for administrative agencies and the
Legislature.”74
However, the Restatement (Third) incorporated the “Good
Samaritan” or “volunteer” rule that one who undertakes a rescue must act
reasonably so as not to put the rescued party in worse shape than
before.75 This rule, in the context of products liability, comes from the
belief that voluntary recalls are typically undertaken in the anticipation
that a government agency will require one anyway.76
This belief by the ALI and some courts may be correct in a
general sense. However, there are many voluntary recalls, retrofits, or
even post-sale warning programs that are done to enhance safety and
would not constitute a post-sale duty under section 10. With this doctrine
incorporated into the Restatement (Third), it is likely, though impossible
to prove for certain, that only those manufacturers who undertook truly
voluntary programs were prepared to do so in a way that would not be
considered negligent. This determination is difficult and case-specific.
Hopefully, more manufacturers will “do the right thing” and try
to improve the safety of their products and try to anticipate what might
be considered reasonable. Unfortunately, the fact that an accident
happened means, by definition, that the post-sale remedial program was
arguably ineffective for the injured party.
69

RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 (1998).
Id. cmt. a (“The duty to recall or repair should be distinguished from a post-sale duty
to warn about product hazards discovered after sale.”).
71
Id.
72
Id. (“Moreover, even when a product is defective within the meaning of § 2, § 3, or
§ 4, an involuntary duty to recall should be imposed on the seller only by a governmental directive
issued pursuant to statute or regulation.”); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2061(b)(1) (2006).
73
Gregory v. Cincinnati Inc., 538 N.W.2d 325, 333-34 (Mich. 1995).
74
Id. at 334; accord Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1315
(Kan. 1993); Morrison v. Kubota Tractor Corp., 891 S.W.2d 422, 429-30 (Mo. Ct. App. 1994).
75
See supra note 18.
76
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 11 cmt. c (1998).
70
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DEVELOPMENT OF POST-SALE DUTY LAW AFTER 1998

As our earlier discussion suggests, the rules that have evolved
regarding a post-sale duty to warn fall into three general categories: (1)
no duty if the product was reasonably safe at the time of sale; (2) a duty
to warn only of risks that existed at the time of sale but were only later
revealed; and (3) a duty to warn when a reasonable manufacturer would
do so. This last rule is the broadest and is the one reflected in Section 10.
Under the Restatement’s rule, a manufacturer could have a duty
to warn even of risks that did not exist at the time of the product’s sale.
There may be a duty to warn under Section 10 if, for example, new
safety technology becomes available that was not available at the time
the product was originally sold, the new design eliminates a substantial
risk arising from the product’s original design, and the manufacturer can
readily identify and communicate an effective warning to the product’s
current users.
Even under this rule, however, there will typically be no postsale duty to inform of the availability of a product-safety improvement
because the product users would be difficult to trace, the warning would
not effectively reduce the risk inherent in the original design, or a
reasonable manufacturer may find other reasons to decide against
attempts to warn.77
An examination of the cases reveals that a few courts have
specifically adopted as the law of their jurisdiction the Restatement
(Third)’s negligence-based post-sale duty to warn and its section 10
factors for determining when that duty arises. Other courts that have
essentially adopted the section 10 reasonable manufacturer rule did so
before the adoption of the Restatement (Third). Since the Restatement
(Third)’s adoption, other courts have recognized a post-sale duty to warn
without actually mentioning the Restatement. Some jurisdictions have
specifically rejected section 10 and others have refused to adopt a postsale duty to warn without mentioning the Restatement (Third). A fair
number of cases decided both before and after ALI’s adoption of the
Restatement (Third) have imposed a post-sale duty to warn, limited to
latent risks that existed at the time of sale. And finally, a few cases have
specifically adopted section 13.
We have organized our brief discussion of the post-Restatement
(Third) case law into the categories just described.
A.

Cases Specifically Adopting Section 10

In Lewis v. Ariens Company, the Supreme Judicial Court of
Massachusetts specifically adopted “the principles set forth in the
77

See id. § 10 (Reporter’s Note to cmt. a).
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Restatement (Third) . . . regarding a manufacturer’s continuing duty to
warn users of substantial product risks or dangers discovered postsale.”78
Lewis injured his hand in the impeller blades of a snow blower
when he slipped and fell causing his hand to enter the machine’s
discharge chute. The snow blower was manufactured and originally sold
in 1966 by Ariens Company. Studies published in 1971 and 1975
identified the dangers of the snow blower as it was originally designed.
Lewis had purchased the machine from the sister of a friend in 1982,
sixteen years after it was sold by Ariens. The accident occurred in 1988.
In an earlier holding, the court had abandoned a strict liability
approach in favor of negligence principles and revised Massachusetts’
law to say that a manufacturer is subject to a continuing duty to warn of
risks discovered following the sale of a product.79 Ariens Company
argued, however, that any post-sale duty to warn did not extend to
remote purchasers. In response, the court pointed out that section 10 does
not limit the duty to warn to direct purchasers only.80 But the court also
observed that comment e to section 10 says that a seller’s inability to
identify those for whom warnings may be useful may prevent a duty
from arising, and that comment a to section 10 notes that the costs of
identifying and communicating with product users years after sale are
often daunting. On the facts of this case, the court found that Ariens had
no duty to warn Lewis,
who purchased the product at least second hand, sixteen years after it was
originally sold, and did not own the product until years after a duty to provide
additional warnings arguably arose. In these circumstances, he is a “member of
a universe too diffuse and too large for manufacturers or sellers of original
equipment to identify.”81

Nevertheless, the court concluded that “the principles set forth in
[section] 10 represent a logical and balanced embodiment” of
Massachusetts’ post-sale duty to warn rule.82
Even earlier, the Supreme Court of Iowa had specifically
adopted section 10 and its factors for determining whether a product
seller has a post-sale duty to warn. In Lovick v. Wil-Rich,83 a farmer was
injured when he attempted to lower the wings of a cultivator into position
to begin cultivation. When Lovick removed a pin designed to hold the
78

751 N.E.2d 862, 864 (Mass. 2001).
Vassallo v. Baxter Healthcare Corp., 696 N.E.2d 909, 923 (Mass. 1998). Both Lewis
and Vassallo involved the issue of whether the product manufacturer had breached the implied
warranty of merchantability by failing to warn of the risk giving rise to the injury. But in Hoffman v.
Houghton Chemical Corp., 751 N.E.2d 848, 859 (Mass. 2001), the Massachusetts court expressly
recognized that negligent failure to warn and failure to warn under breach of warranty are to be
judged by the same standard: the reasonableness of the defendant’s actions in the circumstances.
80
751 N.E.2d at 866.
81
Id. at 867.
82
Id.
83
588 N.W.2d 688 (Iowa 1999).
79
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wing in a vertical position in the event of a hydraulic or mechanical
failure, the wing immediately fell on him because the linkage holding the
hydraulic cylinder to the wing was broken. The cultivator that injured
Lovick was manufactured and sold by Wil-Rich in 1981 and then sold by
the original buyer to a second owner in the late 1980s. Lovick, an
experienced farmer, was using the cultivator to cultivate a field
belonging to the machine’s owner.84
The cultivator bore a warning sign which cautioned users to
remove the pin prior to lowering the wings. The operator’s manual
warned against going under the wings to remove the pins. In 1983, WilRich learned that a wing of one of its cultivators had fallen and injured
the operator. The company subsequently received several other such
reports. In 1988, the company began to affix a warning label to its
cultivators warning of the danger of going under the wing to remove the
pin. In 1994, Wil-Rich began a campaign to notify owners of its
cultivators of the danger of falling wings and also made a backup safetylatch kit available for installation on the wings. At trial, Lovick
introduced evidence that a competitor of Wil-Rich instituted a safety
program in 1983 for its similarly designed cultivator after learning of
instances of the wing falling on the operator. The competitor’s safety
program included efforts to locate the cultivator owners and equip the
machines with a safety latch and an upgraded warning label.85
The Iowa legislature had enacted a products liability state-of-theart defense statute in 1986 that provided, inter alia, that “[n]othing in this
section shall diminish the duty . . . to warn concerning subsequently
acquired knowledge of a defect or dangerous condition that would . . .
diminish the liability for failure to warn.”86 Although the post-sale duty
to warn is rooted in general negligence principles, the Lovick court said
that “there are some distinctions which are important to recognize in
considering the scope and nature of the post-sale duty [to warn].
Foremost, the burden of a manufacturer to warn product users can
radically change after the sale has occurred and the manufacturer no
longer has control over the product.”87 The “fighting question,” said the
court, “is whether it is necessary to articulate the various factors to
consider in analyzing the reasonableness of a manufacturer’s conduct
once it acquires knowledge of a defect in the product following the
sale.”88 Concluding that the trial court’s general negligence instructions
to the jury had failed to give adequate guidance as to how to assess the
reasonableness of the manufacturer’s post-sale conduct, the court said
that a jury must be instructed to consider those factors which make it
84
85
86
87
88

Id.
Id.
IOWA CODE § 688.12 (1987).
Lovick, 588 N.W.2d at 694.
Id. at 695.
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burdensome or impractical to provide a post-sale warning. Consequently,
the court said “we adopt the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products
Liability section 10, including the need to articulate the relevant factors
to consider in determining the reasonableness of providing a warning
after the sale.”89
The New York Court of Appeals, in Liriano v. Hobart Corp.,
also specifically cited section 10 for the proposition that a manufacturer
may have a post-sale duty to warn in certain circumstances, including
instances in which a product’s designed-in safety features have been
circumvented or removed by product users and this fact is known to the
manufacturer.90 Liriano, a grocery store employee, was injured in 1993
while using the store’s meat grinder without its safety guard. The meat
grinder was manufactured and sold in 1961 with a safety guard affixed
that prevented a user’s hands from coming into contact with the grinding
“worm.” No warnings were placed on the meat grinder to indicate that it
was dangerous to operate the machine without the safety guard in place.
Hobart began to include such warnings in 1962. At the time of the
accident, the safety guard had been removed and Hobart knew, before
the accident, that removals of this sort were occurring.91 The court
concluded that a post-sale modification of the product was not in and of
itself a defense to a post-sale duty to warn claim.92 The court said that
“[s]uch a duty will generally arise where a defect or danger is revealed
by user operation and brought to the attention of the manufacturer; the
existence and scope of such a duty are generally fact-specific.”93 But it
did not decide whether, on the facts of the case, Hobart had a post-sale
duty to warn.
In Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc.,94 the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Eighth Circuit reaffirmed its earlier holding in another
case that South Dakota law permits recovery for a negligent post-sale
duty to warn.95 Referring specifically to section 10, the court concluded
that the product manufacturer “did not breach a post-sale duty to warn in
this case”96 involving a printing press sold in the 1940s, more than 50
years before being acquired by the injured party’s employer. Though the
court found there was no breach,97 it likely meant that there was simply
89

Id. at 695-96; see also Ahlberg v. Chrysler Corp., 481 F.3d 630, 633 (8th Cir. 2007)
(“[I]n Iowa both a pre- and a post-sale duty to warn have been recognized as separate negligence
theories of recovery.”).
90
700 N.E.2d 303, 307 n.3 (N.Y. 1998) (manufacturer’s post sale duty to warn depends
on a number of factors including degree of danger product involves, number of reported incidents,
burden of providing warning, and burden or ability to track product after sale).
91
Id. at 305.
92
Id. at 306.
93
Id. at 307.
94
500 F.3d 691 (8th Cir. 2007).
95
Novak v. Navistar Int’l. Trans. Corp., 46 F.3d 844, 850 (8th Cir. 1995).
96
Brandtjen, 500 F.3d at 697.
97
Id.
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no post-sale duty to warn in this case. It does say that, given the passage
of time, it would be unreasonable to require the manufacturer to identify
and warn all of the owners of its products.98 The difficulty of identifying
those who need to be warned is an important factor under section 10 in
determining whether a duty exists in the first place.
Section 10 is also cited by the Florida District Court of Appeals
in Sta-Rite Industries, Inc. v. Levey as authority for the proposition that a
swimming pool pump manufacturer had a duty to warn of the dangers of
an unsecured protective grate covering the pool drain.99 However, StaRite is not a post-sale duty case; the duty to warn in that case existed at
the time the pump was first sold by the manufacturer.100
Finally, in Brown v. Crown Equipment Corp.,101 a federal district
court ruling on a defense motion in limine concluded that Maine would
recognize a negligence-based post-sale duty to warn where a
manufacturer’s product is not defective at the time of sale but a hazard
later develops because of a change in the user environment. It
subsequently affirmed that view in ruling against the defendant’s motion
for judgment as a matter of law after a jury had returned a verdict in the
plaintiff’s favor, resting its conclusion specifically on the view taken by
the Restatement in section 10.102 In Brown, the plaintiff was killed while
operating a forklift in a warehouse. The forklift was manufactured in
1989. In 1995, the manufacturer learned that new shelf design in many
warehouses exposed forklift operators to the risk of shelving entering the
forklift operator’s area at an unshielded level and striking the operator.
The manufacturer developed an upgrade kit for the forklift that extended
the height of the operator’s backrest thus reducing the risk of intrusions
into the operator’s area. However, the manufacturer did not convey this
information to the forklift owner who was the plaintiff’s employer.103 On
appeal, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit said that, because
other jurisdictions have disagreed on this question and the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court had not spoken, the issue should be certified to
the Maine court.104 In response, the Maine Supreme Judicial Court said
that “in limited circumstances . . . there can be a post-sale duty to warn
indirect purchasers, but we have not and do not now adopt . . . § 10.”105
The Maine court went on to rule, however, that under the ordinary

98

Id.
909 So. 2d 901, 905 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005).
100
The court says that a jury question was presented as to whether the defendant had a
duty to warn the “purchaser,” clearly implying that the duty existed at the time of sale. Sta-Rite, 909
So. 2d at 905.
101
460 F. Supp. 2d 188 (D. Me. 2006).
102
Id. at 192-93.
103
Brown v. Crown Equip. Co., 501 F.3d 75, 76 (1st Cir. 2007).
104
Id. at 78.
105
Brown v. Crown Equip. Corp., 960 A.2d 1188, 1190 (Me. 2008).
99
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common law principles of Maine negligence law, the manufacturer owed
the plaintiff a post-sale duty to warn on the facts of this case.106
B.

Cases Adopting a Reasonable Manufacturer Rule Decided Prior
to the Adoption of the Restatement (Third)

Several other jurisdictions, in cases decided before the ALI’s
final approval of section 10, have adopted a reasonable manufacturer
standard for determining when a post-sale duty exists and utilized similar
factors in deciding reasonableness.107
Robinson v. Brandtjen & Kluge, Inc. is a case in which the
product’s design was state-of-the-art and was not defective at the time of
manufacture but subsequent improvements in technology had made a
safer design feasible at the time the injury occurred.108 Brown v. Crown
Equipment is arguably a case in which there was no risk in the original
product design but a risk arose when the operating environment for the
product was subsequently changed. Both Lewis v. Ariens and Lovick v.
Wil-Rich are examples of cases in which the product as originally
designed carried a latent risk that did not become reasonably apparent
until after the product had left the manufacturer’s control. However,
nothing in either opinion suggests that the post-sale duty to warn is
limited to cases involving latent risks, and the courts’ specific adoption
of section 10’s principles indicate that there is no such limit on the duty.
C.

Cases Recognizing Post-Sale Duty to Warn Decided After
Adoption of Restatement (Third) but Not Mentioning Section 10

Since the Restatement (Third)’s adoption, other courts have
recognized a post-sale duty to warn without mentioning section 10. The
106

Id. at 1193.
See, e.g., Patton v. Hutchinson Wil-Rich Mfg. Co., 861 P.2d 1299, 1314-15 (Kan.
1993) (liability depends on reasonableness test, which looks at “(1) the nature of the harm that may
result from use without notice, (2) the likelihood that harm will occur . . . (3) how many persons are
affected, (4) the economic burden on the manufacturer of identifying and contacting current product
users . . . (5) the nature of the industry, (6) the type of product involved, (7) the number of units
manufactured or sold, and (8) steps taken other than giving of notice to correct the problem”); Cover
v. Cohen, 461 N.E.2d 864, 872 (N.Y. 1984) (“The nature of the warning to be given and to whom it
should be given likewise turn upon a number of factors, including the harm that may result from use
of the product without notice, the reliability and any possible adverse interest of the person, if other
than the user, to whom notice is given, the burden on the manufacturer or vendor involved in
locating the persons to whom notice is required to be given, the attention which it can be expected a
notice in the form given will receive from the recipient, the kind of product involved and the number
manufactured or sold, and the steps taken, other than the giving of notice, to correct the problem.”
(citations omitted)); Crowston v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 521 N.W.2d 401, 409 (N.D. 1994)
(“The reasonableness of the post-sale warnings depend on the facts of each particular case” looking
at “(1) the nature of the harm . . . (2) the likelihood that harm will occur . . . (3) how many persons
are affected . . . (4) the economic burden on the manufacturer of identifying and contacting current
product users . . . (5) the nature of the industry, (6) the type of product involved, (7) the number of
units manufactured or sold, and (8) steps taken other than giving of notice to correct the problem.”).
108
See Brandtjen, 500 F.3d at 696.
107

980

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 74:3

Court of Appeals of Louisiana has observed that the Louisiana Products
Liability Act has a provision that states:
A manufacturer of a product who, after the product has left his control, acquires
knowledge of a characteristic of the product that may cause damage and the
danger of such characteristic, or who would have acquired such knowledge had
he acted as a reasonably prudent manufacturer, is liable for damage caused by
his subsequent failure to use reasonable care to provide an adequate warning of
such characteristic and its danger to users and handlers of the product.109

Connecticut imposes liability for a negligent breach of a
manufacturer’s continuing, post-sale duty to warn of “known or
knowable dangers associated with using its product.”110 Georgia law
imposes on product manufacturers “a duty to exercise ordinary care to
warn users of a known or reasonably foreseeable risk of injury or death
after a product’s sale.”111 And under North Dakota law, “when a
manufacturer learns about the dangers associated with the use of its
product after it is manufactured and sold, the manufacturer has a postsale duty to warn about these dangers.”112 All of these jurisdictions
appear to reflect the Restatement’s negligence-based duty to warn postsale but do not make clear whether section 10’s factors for determining
reasonableness are the relevant factors for making the duty
determination.
D.

Cases Specifically Rejecting Section 10

A few courts have rejected section 10 and have done so for
different reasons. In Palmer v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., the
Mississippi Court of Appeals concluded that there is no post-sale duty to
warn under that state’s products liability act,113 the relevant portion of
which provides:
The manufacturer or seller of the product shall not be liable if the claimant does
not prove by the preponderance of the evidence that at the time the product left
the control of the manufacturer or seller . . . [t]he product was defective
because it failed to contain adequate warnings or instructions.114

In Modelski v. Navistar International Transportation Corp., the
Appellate Court of Illinois phrased the question as “whether such a duty
[to warn] includes an obligation to issue post-sale warnings of dangers
109

LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:2800.57(C) (2008); Welch v. Technotrim, Inc., 778 So. 2d
728, 734 (La. Ct. App. 2001).
110
Densberger v. United Techs. Corp., 297 F.3d 66, 69-70 n.3 (2d Cir. 2002).
111
Watkins v. Ford Motor Co., 190 F.3d 1213, 1219 (11th Cir. 1999) (applying Georgia
law); Smith v. Ontario Sewing Machine Co., 548 S.E.2d 89, 94 (Ga. Ct. App. 2001).
112
Olson v. Ford Motor Co., 410 F. Supp. 2d 855, 863 (D.N.D. 2006) (quoting North
Dakota Pattern Jury Instruction C-21.25 (1996)).
113
905 So.2d 564, 601 (Miss. Ct. App. 2003), rev’d in part on other grounds, 904 So.2d
1077 (Miss. 2005).
114
MISS. CODE ANN. § 11-1-63(a)(i)(2) (Rev. 2002) (emphasis added).
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which were not known, nor should they have been known, at the time the
product left the manufacturer’s control.”115 Modelski was killed when the
seat on his Farmall tractor tilted backwards and he fell into the blades of
a rotary mower that he was towing. The tractor seat was mounted atop
the battery box cover that was hinged at the rear and secured at the front
by two bolts. The tractor carried no warning of the consequences that
might result if the bolts holding the front of the battery box cover failed
or somehow became disengaged. The bolts did fail, allowing the battery
box cover and seat to tilt to the rear. The tractor was manufactured in
1957.116 Modelski had bought the tractor in 1989, two years before his
fatal 1991 accident, from someone who had acquired it in 1983 at a farm
auction.117 The appellate court concluded that there was no post-sale duty
to warn in negligence actions in Illinois, citing the Illinois Supreme
Court’s 1980 opinion in Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., holding that in a
strict liability action for failure to warn the plaintiff must prove that the
manufacturer knew or should have known of the injury-causing
propensity of its product at the time the product left its control.118 The
Modelski court concluded that there was “no reason to lessen that burden
in a negligence action.”119 It is impossible to tell if the court was
influenced by the fact that the tractor was first sold thirty-four years
before the accident and had passed through the hands of several owners.
That fact alone could support a conclusion that it was not possible to
effectively communicate a warning of the risk to current tractor users and
that thus there was no post-sale duty to warn in these circumstances. But
the court did not limit its ruling to the facts of the case at hand, declaring
instead that there is simply no post-sale duty to warn in either strict
liability or negligence actions in Illinois.120
The Tennessee Court of Appeals declared, in a case where a fire
was caused when a pillow came into contact with the unshielded bulb of
a halogen lamp, that “Tennessee does not recognize a post-sale duty to
warn. Although the Restatement (Third) of Torts adopts some post-sale
duties, Tennessee [has] not adopted these provisions . . . .”121 And in
Stanger v. Smith & Nephew, Inc., a federal district court concluded that
even though “there is no strong indication that the Missouri Supreme
Court would adopt the RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS, which imposes
115

707 N.E.2d 239, 246 (Ill. App. Ct. 1999).
Id. at 241-42.
117
Id. at 241.
118
Woodill v. Parke Davis & Co., 402 N.E.2d 194, 199 (Ill. 1980).
119
Modelski, 707 N.E.2d at 246; see also Birchler v. Gehl Co., 88 F.3d 518, 521 (7th Cir.
1996) (“The well established and generally accepted law in Illinois is that manufacturers do not have
a continuing duty to warn.”).
120
Modelski, 707 N.E.2d at 247.
121
Irion v. Sun Lighting, Inc., No. M2002-00766-COA-R3-CV, 2004 WL 746823, at *17
(Tenn. Ct. App. Apr. 7, 2004); see also Mohr v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., No. W2006-01382-COAR3-CV, 2008 WL 4613584, at *19 (Tenn. Ct. App. Oct. 14, 2008) (“Tennessee does not recognize a
manufacturer’s post-sale duty to warn.”).
116
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a continuous duty to warn” as the general rule,122 the defendants in the
case sub judice did owe a post-sale duty to warn. The product that caused
the injury was a medical device for which, as with prescription drugs,
there is an already established continuing duty to keep abreast of
scientific developments affecting the manufacturer’s product and warn
the medical community of any newly discovered risks.123
E.

Other Cases Refusing to Adopt a Post-Sale Duty to Warn

Other jurisdictions have decided against creating a post-sale duty
to warn without reference to the Restatement (Third). In Anderson v.
Nissan Motor Co., Ltd., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit
found that Nebraska would not impose a post-sale duty to warn.124 The
primary reason for this conclusion was Nebraska case law emphasizing
that Nebraska’s rules of evidence generally prohibit evidence of remedial
measures taken subsequent to an injury causing event.125 No reference
was made in the court’s opinion to section 10.
In Oklahoma, plaintiffs in products liability actions must prove,
inter alia, “that the defect existed in the product at the time it left the
control of the defendant.”126 There may be liability for failure to warn at
the time of sale but Oklahoma law “does not recognize a post-sale duty
to warn or retrofit a product,”127 a rule established before adoption of
section 10. And “[u]nder Texas products liability law, a manufacturer has
no duty to warn about a product after it has been manufactured and
sold.”128
F.

Cases Adopting a Post-Sale Duty to Warn but Only of Latent
Risks

In cases decided both before and after ALI’s adoption of the
Restatement (Third), some courts have adopted a post-sale duty to warn
but have limited the scope of that duty to warning of only those risks that
existed at the time of the product’s sale but were not then reasonably

122

401 F. Supp. 2d 974, 982 (E.D. Mo. 2005) (citations omitted).
Id. at 983.
124
139 F.3d 599, 602 (8th Cir. 1998).
125
Id. at 601-02 (citing Rahmig v. Mosley Mach. Co., 412 N.W.2d 56, 82 (Neb. 1987)).
126
Lee v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 688 P.2d 1283, 1285 (Okla. 1984).
127
Wicker v. Ford Motor Co., 393 F. Supp. 2d 1229, 1236 (W.D. Okla. 2005).
128
Bryant v. Giacomini, S.p.A., 391 F. Supp. 2d 495, 503 (N.D. Tex. 2005); McLennan v.
Am. Eurocopter Corp., Inc., 245 F.3d 403, 430 (5th Cir. 2001) (“Texas courts generally do not
recognize any post-sale duty to warn of product hazards arising after the sale.”); see also Moore v.
Ford Motor Co., No. 08-02092, 2008 WL 3981839, at *3 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 22, 2008) (“Texas does
not recognize a post-sale duty to warn . . . .”); Torrington Co. v. Stutzman, 46 S.W.3d 829, 836 (Tex.
2000) (“Texas does not recognize post-sale duty to warn of product defects not discovered until after
manufacture and sale.”).
123
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discoverable.129 When a manufacturer discovers or should have
discovered such a latent risk, a duty to warn of the risk then arises.
The rule in Arizona is that there is a duty to warn post-sale but
only “where a manufacturer or seller, believing that it has sold a nondefective product, subsequently learns that its product was, in fact,
defective when placed in the stream of commerce.”130 Colorado, applying
Restatement (Second)’s section 402A strict liability principles, limits the
post-sale duty to warn to cases “where a danger concerning the product
becomes known to the manufacturer subsequent to the sale and delivery
of the product, even though it was not known at the time of the sale.”131
Under Maryland law, “[e]ven if there is no duty to warn at the time of the
sale, facts may thereafter come to the attention of the manufacturer
which make it imperative that a warning then be given.”132 Michigan law,
using negligence principles, says that a post-sale duty to warn may
arise—but only if a latent defect existed in the product at the point of
manufacture.133 In Ohio, “a manufacturer or vendor is negligent when he
has knowledge of a latent defect rendering a product unsafe and fails to
provide a warning of such defect.”134 The scope of the post-sale duty to
warn in these states is more limited than the duty under section 10 which
may impose a post-sale warning duty even if there was no undiscovered
risk in the product at the time of sale.
A few states still embrace a strict liability standard for failure to
warn cases. Pennsylvania has rejected the rule set forth in section 10 but
does impose a post-sale duty to warn of defects existing at the time of
sale.135 In Walton v. Avco Corp., the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ruled
that a helicopter manufacturer had a post-sale duty to warn of a defective
engine when the manufacturer learned after the sale of the helicopter, but
before the injury, that the defect existed at the time the helicopter left the
manufacturer’s hands.136 In Lynch v. McStome and Lincoln Plaza
Associates, however, the Superior Court of Pennsylvania ruled that no
post-sale duty to warn exists where no defect existed in the product at the
time of sale.137 Lynch was injured when an escalator on which she was
riding came to an abrupt stop.138 She appealed from a jury verdict in
129
130

omitted).

131

See infra notes 130-140.
Wilson v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 972 P.2d 235, 240 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1998) (emphasis

Romero v. Int’l Harvester Co., 979 F.2d 1444, 1449 (10th Cir. 1992) (emphasis
omitted) (applying Colorado law).
132
Ragin v. Porter Hayden Co., 754 A.2d 503, 516-17 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000).
133
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favor of the defendants, arguing that she should have been allowed to
introduce evidence showing that the manufacturer had failed to notify the
owner that a new escalator braking system, used by the manufacturer on
its newer escalators, would have avoided the abrupt stop.139 But the court
ruled that there was no post-sale duty to warn about changes in
technology if the product was not defective at the time of sale.140
G.

Cases Specifically Adopting Section 13

Finally, a few cases have adopted section 13 of the Restatement
(Third) as the governing rule. In Gamradt v. Federal Laboratories,
Inc.,141 the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit said that under
Minnesota law, a duty to warn will be imposed on a successor
corporation only after considering the following, non-exhaustive list of
relevant factors: (1) succession to a predecessor’s service contracts, (2)
coverage of the particular machine under a service contract, (3) service
of that machine by the purchaser corporation, and (4) a purchaser
corporation’s knowledge of defects and of the location or owner of that
machine. The court then cited to section 13, comment b: “The crux of the
inquiry is whether the successor corporation has benefited economically
from its relationship with the predecessor’s customers.”142 And in Tabor
v. Metal Ware Corp., the Supreme Court of Utah said that “Utah imposes
on a successor corporation an independent post-sale duty to warn of a
predecessor corporation’s product defects under the conditions outlined
in section 13 of the Restatement (Third) of Torts.”143
H.

Summary

In sum, those sections of the Restatement (Third) dealing with
post-sale duties have received a mixed but generally favorable reception
in the law since 1998. Where the post-sale duty issue was one of first
impression, the Restatement position has been adopted more often than
rejected. No need has apparently been felt to formally adopt section 10 in
the several states whose law had already developed along the lines of that
section’s principles but before the adoption of the Restatement. At least
one state has rejected section 10 but does impose a post-sale duty to warn
of risks that were inherent in the product at the time of sale. And a few
states have explicitly rejected section 10 either because their statutes or
rules of evidence limit liability to situations where there was a failure to
warn at the time the product left the control of the manufacturer or seller,
139
140
141
142
143

Id. at 1278.
Id. at 1281.
380 F.3d 416 (8th Cir. 2004).
Id. at 421.
168 P.3d 814, 816 (Utah 2007).
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or under “strict liability” principles, liability can only be imposed for
warning failures at the time of sale. A few states that had earlier decided
against adopting a post-sale duty to warn have not been influenced by
section 10 to change their minds.
XI.

REGULATORY POST-SALE DUTIES

The above discussion pertains to the common law of post-sale
duties as it exists in the United States. While it is beyond the scope of
this Article, it is appropriate to briefly mention the ever-expanding
regulatory requirements in the United States and around the world.
Regulatory agencies in the United States have been in existence
for decades. Each agency that deals with post-sale duties has been
expanding and refining the responsibility of the manufacturer, product
seller, and product user to report safety issues to the government and
possibly to engage in some post-sale remedial program.
The main U.S. agencies are the Consumer Product Safety
Commission (“CPSC”), the National Highway Traffic Safety
Administration (“NHTSA”), and the Food and Drug Administration
(“FDA”). Most recently, Congress revised the CPSC’s laws and
regulations to expand reporting responsibilities and increase the fines for
not reporting.144
In addition, the European Union, Japan, Canada, Australia, and
other countries have enacted or enhanced reporting and recall
responsibilities for manufacturers and product sellers.145
These government reporting responsibilities are generally more
stringent than the common law post-sale duties and, therefore,
manufacturers of regulated products will first look to regulatory
requirements before even considering any common law duties.
Considering both regulatory and common law requirements is important,
however, since any products liability case will allege a violation of
common law post-sale duties and not a violation of some government
reporting responsibility.
Also, since compliance with the government’s recall
requirements will not normally be a defense in a products liability case,
the manufacturer and product seller will need to consider how far to go
in the recall to defend itself against a negligent recall claim.

144

Consumer Product Safety Improvement Act (CPSIA) of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-314, §
207, 122 Stat. 3016, 3044 (2008); see also 15 U.S.C. § 2064 (section 15(b)); 15 U.S.C. § 2069
(section 20).
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CONCLUSION

Post-sale duties have been expanding in the United States by
court decision and legislative action. The Restatement (Third) affirms
this expansion and, in some respects, broadens the common law post-sale
responsibilities of manufacturers. Manufacturers must act now to put into
place an appropriate post-sale monitoring system and establish
appropriate committees or trained personnel who can analyze the
gathered information to determine whether post-sale actions might be
appropriate.
A failure to take timely and adequate remedial actions can result
in huge liability, including punitive damages, which could eventually
result in large numbers of injured people and lead to the demise of the
manufacturer.

